The collective security system and the enforcement of international law d' Aspremont, J.
among circles of neophytes and non-specialists, this perennial tale has never been totally ridiculed by international lawyers as, like most fables, it touches on a sensitive chord.
Though international lawyers have developed powerful argumentative tools to diminish the ontologically devastating consequences of this fable, they do not like to be reminded that international law somehow suffers from an enforcement disability. Indeed, the fable points to a recurrent complex afflicting them. Certainly, it is an emotional discomfort that international lawyers have learnt to live with and which they have successfully repressed over time. Yet, like any complex, it is never completely reined in and it resurfaces from time to time, 1 especially when they venture beyond their closed peer-circles. Indeed, when they step out of the epistemic community of international law, international lawyers, confronted with the enforcement disability of international law, feel compelled to rehabilitate international law as law. The "enforcement complex" of international lawyers is particularly rekindled each time blatant violations of international law dominate the headlines of mainstream news media worldwide. This is why international lawyers 1. Sanctions as an authorized form of coercion for the sake of enforcement 1. Sanctions as an authorized form of coercion for the sake of enforcement 1. Sanctions as an authorized form of coercion for the sake of enforcement 1. Sanctions as an authorized form of coercion for the sake of enforcement Strictly speaking, a sanction constitutes only one type of coercion. The term sanction usually refers to that type of coercion, which is authorized in a legal system with a view to changing a subject's reasons for action and reversing any of its behavior that runs contra the prescriptions of that system. 3 Sanctions thus constitute a form of authorized coercion by opposition to the non-authorized forms of coercions which, if performed, can in turn lead to sanctions, i.e. authorized forms of coercion.
Enforcement designates the more global phenomenon by which the system interferes with a subject's reasons for action through the adoption of sanctions with a view to making it abide by its prescription. Enforcement must accordingly be distinguished from compliance control operating independently of breaches, such as fact-finding, verification or inspection. 4 Enforcement is necessarily reactive to a behavior unwanted by the legal an actor's reason for action with a view to making it abide by the standard of conduct prescribed by international law. 10 It would probably be vain to bemoan such semantic nonchalance and suggest a better semantic scheme that would differentiate them. It is uncontested that words have no meaning per se and it is the linguistic usage of a word, within a given interpretative community, 11 that determines its contextual meaning in that community. 12 It would therefore be of no avail to attempt to counter the usage by which these terms are construed as synonymous. Additionally, it remains uncertain whether distinguishing between sanction, coercion and enforcement would enable us to greatly refine our understanding of the whole phenomenon of enforcement. The problems of enforcement in connection with the collective security system in international law are not of a definitional nature. This is why, for the sake of the following considerations, coercion only refers to authorized coercion. The term as it is used here does not refer to the forms of coercion which are expressly prohibited by international law, such as unlawful interference with a subject's consent to a treaty 13 or unlawful interference in internal affairs, 14 and is used interchangeably with sanctions which are a form of exercise of coercive power.
In the UN context, the term sanction is often associated with some specific exercise of nonforcible coercive powers. Kelsen's view, international law was undoubtedly such an underdeveloped order because coercion was mainly decentralized. Yet, he never went so far as Austin to deny that international law was actual law and even explained why it was undeniably so. 29 His demonstration that international law is endowed with enforcement powers was informed by his agenda to help international law survive its inability to prevent the second world war and buoy the emergence of an international order of peace. 30 Kelsen's concept of law, when applied to international law, leads to the conclusion that international law is "true law" for it contains institutions performing coercion. In particular, recognised that enforcement mechanisms are common and that they are not necessary for such systems to be legal systems. simply that there is little awareness by law-applying authorities that they share a linguistic community. In practice, international judges do not cultivate a strong sense of membership to the same linguistic community. Each court, in isolation from one other's activities, carries out the practice of law-ascertainment.
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Here is certainly not the place to dwell on such theoretical questions. For the sake of these brief observations, it suffices to highlight that a Hartian take on international law plays down the Austinian imperatival handicap of international law but unearths another form of disability: the deficient social conscience of courts and tribunals in relation to the social practice feeding in the rule of recognition, and the great inability of the system to produce a consistent social practice of law-identification, without which there cannot be sound and meaningful rules of recognition. In Hart's understanding of law, the Austinian disability of the international legal system is superseded by another, equally serious ailment.
Whatever the actual value of Hart's rebuttal of the Austinian imperatival handicap, it is important to highlight that such an approach has been followed by many international lawyers who construe sanction at best as a condition of the effectiveness of international law and not as a condition of its existence. 50 According to these lawyers, the organization and institutionalization of the sanction are only indications of the degree of institutionalization of a legal order, 51 which in that sense must be seen as lagging behind domestic or regional legal orders. Enforcement in international law has witnessed two key moves over the last two centuries.
There is a lot of controversy regarding the extent to which the collective security system can itself be considered a centralized enforcement mechanism of international law. Irrespective of whether the collective security system can be elevated into an enforcement mechanism per se, its creation has fundamentally impinged the understanding of sanctions by the international legal system of unwanted behaviours at the international level. Whatever the ultimate function performed by the collective security system, its creation has led to a decommissioning of self-help as the primary enforcement tool of international law. For this reason, the first major evolution affecting enforcement is the gradual move to a collective security system and the partial decommissioning of self-help as enforcement tool (a). Over the years, however, the sanction mechanism of the collective security system has itself undergone significant changes, and accordingly sanctions of unwanted behaviours have been customized to an unprecedented degree (b). These two moves, however, should not obfuscate the persistence of other more disparate mechanisms endowed with some enforcement function (c).
a) Decommissioning self a) Decommissioning self a) Decommissioning self a) Decommissioning self----help: the move to the collective s help: the move to the collective s help: the move to the collective s help: the move to the collective security system ecurity system ecurity system ecurity system
Until the 20 th century, international law adopted a very permissive posture towards selfhelp, which was entirely unregulated. As a result, self-help, which includes forcible measures, was elevated into the primary enforcement mechanism of the international legal order. 60 Although performing other functions, such as punitive and retributive, 61 the enforcement function of self-help was both past-looking and forward-looking. Self-help constituted a means for a state to coerce another state to cease the breach of an obligation owed to it and possibly to repair the harm resulting therefrom. international law to be a very positive development and a factor of progress. 63 This shift brought an end to what has been perceived as the dark age of international law. 64 The various steps of this move towards a centralized collective security system are well known. 65 This largely depends on how one construes self-defense. It seems that the dominant position among experts is that, whether in the form of self-defense 74 The International Court of Justice expressly acknowledged this principled decommissioning of self-help as an enforcement measure in its first contentious case:
"The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.
77
A similar position was echoed in the Nicaragua case:
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect." competences to take non-forcible coercive measures. 79 The other fundamental feature of the Charter's collective security system that impacted the debate about the enforcement of international law is the power to adopt the non-forcible measures, which can potentially trump any conflicting rule of international law. Whilst the possibility for a central body to resort to non-forcible coercive measures was already present in the Pact of the League of Nations, 80 the UN Charter reinforced, centralized and systematized such a mechanism.
These provisions were first used during the crisis in Rhodesia in 1965, 81 which was quickly followed by many other instances. 82 It is known to all observers that the use of these nonforcible coercive measures came to surpass the maintenance of international peace and security stricto senso. It is sometimes argued that some of the Security Council's main achievements lie in the non-military measures that it has ordered, 83 as is illustrated today by the Security Council's use of its Chapter VII powers for mostly non-military purposes. justice. In doing so, the "Police" have, in Martti Koskenniemi's famous words, ventured into the "Temple", 88 a development that is at odds with the idea that the promotion of justice has been reserved for General Assembly.
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It is unnecessary to discuss the legality of these radical alterations to the Charter, which were brought about by "subsequent practice" recognised this practice when taking measures against non-state entities. 92 Simultaneously, resulting from the concern over the humanitarian fallout of broad sanctions regimes, the Council turned to the use of "smart sanctions" and in particular to individual-oriented sanctions resting on a listing system by sanctions committees. 93 As early as the crisis in Haiti in the early 1990s, the Security Council had initiated a new model of sanctions based on listings nominally designating individuals.
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The targeting of UNITA leaders 95 and individuals in Sierra Leone followed this trend.
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It is important to realize that such practices still continued to be of a collective nature as targeted individuals were being identified by virtue of their formal participation in a government or an organized insurgent group. This is why, the final step towards full individualization and de-territorialization 97 only came later with the anti-terrorist policies which Member States decided to carry out through the collective security system, rather than through fully decentralized channels. 98 The smart and targeted sanctions which they designed on that occasion -and which further institutionalized the Council's exercise of its coercive powers 99 -reached an unprecedented level of sophistication meant to avoid the fallout witnessed in the case of general and broad sanctions regimes. This practice of smart and targeted sanctions continued to consolidate itself. This did not prove unproblematic, especially in terms of the protection owed to the rights of individuals. 100 Controversies were spurred by the challenge of the European Court of Justice 101 and the creation of an
Ombudsperson. 102 Interestingly, these recent developments have required the use of coercion by the Security Council to undergo a further process of customization and sophistication. 103 Such practice shows that the coercion "authorized" by the international legal system has grown more precise and specific. The customization and sophistication of the exercise of non-forcible coercive power by the Council has reinforced the conviction of international lawyers that the collective security system can effectively perform enforcement functions. The move towards the collective security system and its period of sophistication has had affects on other reactive coercive mechanisms, which must be briefly recalled. The creation of a collective security system, and its growing individualization, customization and overall sophistication, have not occurred in a vacuum. The main change brought about by the collective security system is that coercive powers outside the UN framework can only be non-forcible. Forcible self-help was decommissioned and the power to resort to forcible coercive measures was bestowed exclusively upon the Council. Conversely, the non-forcible coercive powers of the Council were never meant to be exclusive of other coercive measures, either centralized or decentralized. Many of these measures even came with a much more explicit reactive character and were expressly geared towards enforcement.
Three types of such measures can be identified. They can be centralized and internal as in some institutional regimes like the WTO or the EU. 104 They can be completely decentralized, being the object of some coordination by virtue of an international organization, such as the obligation not to recognize. 105 Or, they can be completely decentralized like counter-measures, though coordination is not excluded. These measures perform enforcement sanctions. Among them, counter-measures probably constitute the enforcement measure "par excellence". 106 Such decentralized modes of enforcement of international law can, among other things, even constitute a very powerful tool for the enforcement of international law in the general interest. 107 They can also perform other functions, such as measures possessing a coercive character but not aimed at enforcement.
Instances of this latter type of measures include the termination of a treaty by virtue of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus 108 or the invalidity of a treaty by virtue of unauthorized coercion. 109 Furthermore, there is a range of informal mechanisms which have not been formally organized by international law and which nonetheless can be coercive and geared towards enforcement. This is the case for all measures that constitute retorsion and which do not need to be "authorized" by the international legal system. 110 Eventually, there are all those measures whose coercive effect is purely "reputational" 111 or "spontaneous"
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, whereby the interference boils down to damaging the reputation.
A collective security system has therefore emerged in the 20 th century. The development of targeted and smart sanctions does not necessarily generate a simplification of the range of the coercive measures available in international law. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss how the sophisticated collective security system is to be articulated with regard to other coercive reactive mechanisms. The internal and external complexity of the exercise of coercive powers on the international law plane has been demonstrated. It will now be shown how the design of a collective security system and its great sophistication over the last two decades reinforced the conviction that the collective security system could be endowed with enforcement functions.
4. Enforcement of international law 4. Enforcement of international law 4. Enforcement of international law 4. Enforcement of international law through the collective security system through the collective security system through the collective security system through the collective security system
While there seems to be unanimity among experts and observers that forcible self-help was banned by virtue of the collective security system and the prohibition to use force, 113 there is much disagreement as to the impact of these instruments on the enforcement of international law through non-forcible measures. The decommissioning of self-help 114 and the aforementioned sophistication of the Security Council's exercise of non-forcible coercive power 115 led to the growing expectation that the collective security system could perform enforcement functions, in one way or another. In spite of this general inclination to assign these enforcement responsibilities, there has not been much agreement as to the type of enforcement that could be bestowed upon the UN system. In particular, there have been four diverging views on the enforcement role that such mechanisms could play and which ought to be briefly outlined here. Mention is made of the enforcement of international law as a whole (a), the enforcement of the UN Charter prescriptions (b), the enforcement of peace (c) as well the enforcement of justice though retribution (d) that the collective security system is said to be capable of performing.
a) a) a) a) T T T The collective security system as an enforcement mechanism of international law he collective security system as an enforcement mechanism of international law he collective security system as an enforcement mechanism of international law he collective security system as an enforcement mechanism of international law
According to that view, The use of the sanctions regime of Chapter VII can be considered an enforcement mechanism of international law when the threat to the peace is grounded in violations of international law. A number of authors accordingly argue for the 113 See supra note 56. 114 See supra 3a). 115 See supra 3b).
The collective security system as a self he collective security system as a self he collective security system as a self he collective security system as a self----enforcing regime enforcing regime enforcing regime enforcing regime
The argument that any sanction adopted by virtue of Chapter VII can be seen as an enforcement measure of the Charter itself is likely to be less controversial than the understanding previously mentioned. According to this view, Chapter VII is not a mechanism geared towards law enforcement in general but solely against types of conduct unwanted by the Charter. 127 Such a position is commonly premised on the idea that any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression necessarily constitutes a violation of the Charter and especially of article 2(4). The Charter itself could also be said to provide a limited underpinning for such a reading, particularly regarding those nonforcible measures taken under article 41, which envisages such measures as the enforcement of previous decisions taken by the Council itself.
Generally, the actual occurrence of an act of aggression or a breach of the peace will automatically constitute a violation of article 2 (4), as well as other international obligations. 128 From an empirical perspective, this seems to have been the case when the Security Council sought to sanction what it qualified as an "aggressive act" or an "act of aggression" 129 , or when the Council resorted to the qualification of "breach of the peace". 130 Nevertheless, the connection between a finding of a breach to the peace and an act of aggression cannot be generalized because situations qualified as a "threat to peace" constitute the overwhelming majority of situations in which the Council resorts to the use of its Chapter VII powers. In some cases, the Council acknowledges that its own injunctions have not been respected and it subsequently adopts sanctions to address those a partial and non-exclusive enforcement regime. 135 In that case, Security Council's action, for instance in the form of a recommendation, is said to not to be dependent on a finding under article 39 of the Charter. 136 It goes without saying that while action under articles 41
and 42 of the UN Charter are not precluded by article 94 (2), if they are directed at noncompliance with an ICJ decision, they must be preceded by a finding under article 39.
c) c) c) c) T T T The collective security system as a peace he collective security system as a peace he collective security system as a peace he collective security system as a peace----enforcement regime enforcement regime enforcement regime enforcement regime
The aforementioned objections to an understanding of the collective security system as a
Charter enforcement mechanism explain why the most common view is that, outside of any finding of a violation of international law or of the Charter itself, the collective security system is only a peace enforcement regime. This view is premised on the idea that coercive measures under Chapter VII cannot be construed as sanctions because they are not necessarily a response to a wrong. 137 Simply speaking, such measures are either forcible or non-forcible police measures that are geared towards the maintenance of peace and security. Such conclusions also hold true for complex peacekeeping missions, irrespective of whether they are created by the General Assembly or the Security Council. highly speculative. The practice of deriving the finding of a threat to the peace from a violation of a positive rule of international law or the UN Charter could elevate the collective security system to an indirect enforcement mechanism of either the former or the latter.
The collective security system as punitive system he collective security system as punitive system he collective security system as punitive system he collective security system as punitive system
Although such a view is more isolated, it has been argued that measures adopted under
Chapter VII ultimately have a retributive function. Such a function can complement any of the other enforcement functions mentioned above. Authors amenable to this idea of retribution argue that the collective security system is not devoid of punitive dimensions in its Charter enforcement or peace enforcement role. 145 In this sense, forcible and nonforcible measures under Chapter VII can be construed as retributive, at least in part. This finding may be true as a matter of fact and as a matter of diplomatic discourse. 146 It is probably less a matter of the formal architecture of the UN Charter. 147 The support for a retributive function of the Chapter VII mechanisms shows that another enforcement function has been assigned to the collective security system, namely the enforcement of a vague idea of justice embedded in the Charter. 148 The previous paragraphs have laid out the varying enforcement functions which international lawyers, buoyed by the decommissioning of self-help and the unprecedented sophistication of the collective security system, have assigned to the enforcement of international law, of UN law and of peace, or the enforcement of the vague idea of justice conveyed by the Charter. Although there are diverging opinions as to the nature and extent of the enforcement role that has been bestowed upon the collective security system, most international lawyers ascribe a specific enforcement dimension to the Charter and the collective security system that it establishes. The final section of this chapter will formulate some epistemological observations on the place of enforcement in the ethos of the epistemic community of international law.
5. Enforcement of international law through the collective security system: the need of a 5. Enforcement of international law through the collective security system: the need of a 5. Enforcement of international law through the collective security system: the need of a 5. Enforcement of international law through the collective security system: the need of a catharsis catharsis catharsis catharsis
The epistemic context in which the debate regarding the functions of the collective security system unfolds will now be examined. Attention is paid to the therapeutic effect continuously sought by international lawyers from the collective security system. As alluded to in the introduction of this chapter, there is no doubt that the collective security system and the institution of coercive mechanisms aimed at the maintenance or reestablishment of peace have sustained the self-confidence of a profession long wrought with distress by the enforcement disability of the international legal order. Put differently, confronted with the Austinian imperatival handicap of international law, international lawyers have been able to find solace in a collective security system that, despite being focused on dispute resolution, appeared to provide the teeth that international law was long lacking.
The therapeutic effect of the collective security system has not been limited solely to the rehabilitation of (the project of) international law as law, it has taken on the rehabilitation of a profession as a whole. In turn, the confidence of international lawyers in the credentials of "their law" has been conducive to the self-esteem of the entire profession. Indeed, assured of the ability of international law to enforce and maintain order, an aptitude they attribute to the UN Charter, has generated self-assuredness about the usefulness of their
own their efforts to streamline, understand and, for some of them, develop a system of rules that is not derided as toothless and inoffensive.
This confidence in international law as a whole is derived from the inception of the collective security system, and hence, the profession's self-esteem resulting therefrom has remained hugely dependent on the stability of the system of collective security. When the collective security system enters a zone of dangerous turbulence, the confidence in international law as a whole and in its guardians can usually be seen to dwindle. These fluctuations have continued to hinge significantly on varying perceptions of the authority and effectiveness of the prohibition on the use of force, which the collective security system as a whole is both predicated on and designed to protect. For this reason, I argue that that the perceived solidity of the collective security system is inevitably reflected in the state of the ethos of the profession.
It is hardly controversial to say that the belief of international lawyers in the solidity of the collective security system has been fluctuating over time. The prohibition on the use of force, as well as the ability of the UN collective system to preserve its authority and effectiveness, have been regularly put under strain. Each controversial use of force by a State has sparked dire predictions from international legal scholars who came to envisage the demise of this prohibition. 149 On occasion, claims been made that article 2(4) of the , even by those who usually advocate a rather favorable and progressive reading of the international legal system. 151 We have now entered an era of greater liberalization of the use of force. 152 In my view, such liberalization has not manifested itself in either the dislocation of the prohibition on the use of force or the invocation of new "limitations" 153 to the prohibition. This conclusion is illustrated by the almost unanimous rejection of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 154 and the absence of any alteration of ius ad bellum by the surprisingly successful doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect. Instead, the liberalization of the use of force in international law has materialized in a loosening framework for collective security and in the particular dilution of the existing limitations. The latter phenomenon can be seen in particular in the broadening of both the limits of Security Council's authorizations 156 and the concept of self-use of force is the cornerstone of their system of thoughts, and their ethos. It is this realization that leads international lawyers to deride those who venture to claim that contemporary practice has been lethal for the prohibition at the heart of the collective security system. The interpretative community of international law is dominated by bigotry towards the collective security system and its basic foundational norm. This prejudice in favor of article 2(4) and the customary corresponding rule is probably what informs, for instance, the common resort to the argumentative construction of an enduring opinio juris 163 to try to salvage the customary rule corresponding to article 2(4) in the front of very contradicting practice. 164 This prejudice in favor of article 2(4) and the corresponding customary rule is what brings me back to the question of enforcement. It is uncontested that international lawyers' understanding of the collective security system remains deeply affected by the respective conception of each scholar of the rules regulating the use of force and the aspirations that each has vested in the collective security system. 165 The particular necessity felt by an entire interpretative community to uphold article 2(4) and its corresponding customary rule constitutes the manifestation of its aspirations in terms of enforcement of international law.
The prejudice in favor of an ever-lasting prohibition on the use of force is the direct consequence of the assignment of enforcement tasks to the collective security system. In other words, it is because international lawyers endow some enforcement function to the very system whose sustainability hinges on the preservation of the prohibition that they avoid confronting anything that would demote article 2(4) to a norm close to desuetude.
Accordingly, I suspect that, whether consciously or not, international lawyers have been balking at considering the death of the prohibition on the use of force out of fear this would wreak havoc on a collective security system that is crucial to their confidence in international law as a whole.
In the light of the foregoing, I believe that stripping our understandings of the collective security system entirely of its enforcement dimensions would certainly help assuage our fears of losing confidence in the system and of enfeebling our self-esteem. Such a move would allow us to look without complex at article 2(4) and the collective security system.
We should emancipate ourselves from the straightjacket of enforcement and confront the collective security system in earnest. In this sense, it is not until we overcome the projection of our desire for enforcement into the collective security system that we will be capable of liberating ourselves from a constraining complex. Disempowering the collective security system of any enforcement function would allow bolster the profession toward selfempowerment and enable us regain our ability to look more transparently at the collective security system. What the profession needs is not another round of studies on the enforcement function performed by the collective security mechanisms. What it needs is a catharsis to purge the mindset of the interpretative community of international law from its multifaceted obsession to construe the coercive powers authorized by the UN Charter as being geared towards the performance of enforcement functions.
